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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
PLEWE CONSTRUCTION C 0 MPANY, a corporation, and THE
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, VERNAL ANDERSON,
BILL HUNT and JOHN MARSHALL,

Case No.
7753

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 13, 1951 Vernal Anderson filed an application with the Industrial Commission of Utah, in which
he claimed that he was entitled to benefits under the
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Workmen's Compensation Law for accidental injuries he
sustained on January 11, 1951 at the construction site of
the 13th Ward Chapel at 4th East and 1st South Streets
in Salt Lake City. He made the application against the
Plewe Construction Company, Bill Hunt and John Marshall. He alleged that there was a dispute as to whether
the Plewe Construction Company or Bill Hunt and John
Marshall were his employer at the time of his accident.
The Plewe Construction Company had its workmen's compensation insurance in the State Insurance Fund. Bill Hunt
and John IVIarshall did not have any workmen's compensation insurance on the date of Vernal Anderson's accident.
In its decision and order of June 20, 1951 the Industrial
Commission adopted the Referee's recommended findings
of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that
"Plewe Construction Company was an employer
which procured shingling to be done in whole or in
part for it by contractors or employees over whose
work it retained supervision and control and that
such work is a part and process of the general trade
and business of Plewe Construction Company.
"The Referee therefore concludes that an order
of the Commission should issue requiring defendants, Plewe Construction Company and the State
Insurance Fund to pay all medical and hospital expenses reasonably incurred by applicant in the treatment of his injuries as aforesaid and compensation.

* * *"
Immediately preceding this quoted material the Referee gave his opinion that it was not necessary to find that
Hunt and Marshall or Vernal Anderson, the injured man,
were in fact employees of the constr.uction company.
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The Industrial Commission ordered "the defendants"
to pay Anderson's medical expenses and compensation. It
is not entirely clear whether the Commission meant that
all four defendants should make these payments, and if so
in what order or what proportion, inasmuch as Hunt and
Marshall had no compensation insurance but Plewe Construction Company was insured by the State Insurance
Fund.
-~

,.

.(

-~
cl

On July 10, 1951 the Plewe Construction and the State
Insurance Fund filed with the Industrial Commission an
application for rehearing, which application was denied
by the Commission on August 27, 1951. This certiorari proceeding is brought for the purpose of challenging the Commission's decision and order requiring Plewe Construction
Company and the State Insurance Fund to pay any amounts
relating to Vernal Anderson's injuries.
The following facts were brought out in the evidence
at the Industrial Commission's hearing. Plewe Construction Company had the general contract for construction
of the 13th Ward Chapel. Some time about December, 1950,
Mr. Plewe, the president of this company, saw an advertisement in the Salt Lake Tribune which had been put in
that paper by Hunt and Marshall. The advertisement read
something like, "Roofs repaired" or "Leaky roofs fixed"
(R. 40 and 52). The advertisement also contained John
Marshall's telephone number. Mr. Plewe called that number on the phone and talked with Mr. Marshall. In that
conversation and in a further conversation between Mr.
Plewe, Mr. Marshall and Mr. Hunt the following day at the
construction site, Hunt and Marshall assured Plewe that
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they and other men whom they could procure were in a
position to shingle the roof of the chapel right away. It
was agreed that Hunt and Marshall would have the entire
job of shingling the roof and they would be paid $3.25 per
square, a square being 100 square feet.
After Hunt and Marshall had been working alone on
this shingling job awhile, Mr. Plewe said to them that the
weather looked bad and he would like to have them get
the other men they had mentioned in the beginning, so that
the shingling job could be finished as soon as possible.
Hunt and Marshall then put a want ad in the Salt Lake
Tribune, reading something like, "Shinglers wanted," and
giving Hunt's telephone number (R. 15 and 41). Anderson
called Hunt on the telephone in the early morning of January 11, 1951 in response to the want ad. Hunt told him
that if he wanted to do some shingling work he should meet
him at 9:00 o'clock that morning at the 13th \Vard chapel.
Anderson went to the chapel and talked to Marshall, who
had arrived there before Hunt did that morning. After
awhile Hunt came and Hunt, Marshall and Anderson went
up on the roof. First they swept off some snow. Mr. Plewe
came shortly. He and they and two of his carpenters put
up a tarpaulin over the roof where the shingling was to
be done. Within a few minutes after Anderson started
shingling, he fell off the roof and was injured.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
VERNAL ANDERSON WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF PLEWE CONSTRUCTION COlv.l:-
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PANY AND WAS NOT UNDER THAT COMPANY'S SUPERVISION OR CONTROL SO AS
TO MAKE THAT COMPANY LIABLE FOR HIS
ACCIDENTAL INJURY UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW.
fue

It is our contention that when Vernal Anderson received his accidental injury on January 11, 1951, he was
an employee of Hunt and Marshall, who were in partnerlble.
ship as an independent contractor; and the Industrial Com~ mission was in error in ordering anyone besides Hunt and
am Marshall to pay compensation b~nefits to Mr. Anderson.
get
:hat

~

There was not much substantial difference in the testimony
of the witnesses before the Industrial Commission
t~
Ill on matters of fact, but there was some divergence of their
• opinions on legal points. None of the four witnesses was
a legal expert, so their legal opinions are not of much
,:i:;:
Me value. The main point on which the testimony of Mr. Hunt
and Mr. Marshall differed was as to whether they were
lJ~
ii"~i in partnership. Hunt testified that he did not consider
that he and Marshall were partners ; but Marshall testified
Il f~
that
he considered that he and Hunt were in partnership
!Ji'.'•
on their shingling jobs (R. 40 and 53). Their testimony did
:lJ"(;
not differ materially as to the arrangements which they
had made. Hunt and Marshall first met in 1950 when
they were each doing shingling work on different houses
of a certain housing project. They became acquainted and
then decided to take shingling jobs together. They had
completed several jobs prior to the one they took on the
13th Ward Chapel.
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Marshall's opinion that he and Hunt were in partnership was probably correct. Their arrangements were that
they would each share equally on the jobs they took, regardless of the amount of work each one might do. This
element of equal profits and losses is one of the most important in determining whether a partnership actually
exists. In this connection, the letter which they sent to
the Industrial Commission on March 5, 1951 over the signatures of both Hunt and Marshall is interesting (R. 3).
It reads:
"We deny liability under the Utah Workmen's
Compensation Act because Mr. Anderson was not
our employee. His relationship to us was either
partner or fellow employee of Plewe Construction
Co."
With respect to the legal status of Hunt and Marshall
in their relationship with the Plewe Construction Company
on the 13th Ward chapel, Mr. Plewe testified that Hunt
and Marshall took a subcontract for the shingling job, the
company to furnish the shingles, and Hunt and Marshall
to furnish the labor for applying the shingles at an agreed
price of $3.25 per square (R. 61 and 62).
Hunt and Marshall both testified that they did not
think they were independent contractors. Of course, it
would be in their interest to be held as employees of Plewe
Construction Company insofar as Mr. Anderson's accident
and injuries are concerned. If the construction company
and the State Insurance Fund are required to pay Mr. Andersons's compensation benefits, it will relieve Hunt and
Marshall of that financial obligation. Aside from their
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monetary interest in the outcome of the case, the testimony
of Mr. Hunt and Mr. l\1arshall shows the error of their lay
opinion on the legal point in dispute in the case. Both of
them indicated they thought that a party to a contract
must furnish the materials as well as the labor in order
to be constituted a subcontractor. We are not acquainted
with any ruling of this Court ~hich would uphold their
legal conclusion on that point.

.~

Mr. Anderson's attorney, throughout the hearing before the Industrial Commission, asked several questions
of the witnesses relating to the "hiring" and the "wages"
of Hunt and Marshall, apparently with the idea that if the
witness said he was "hired" and received certain "wages,"
it would prove the existence of an employment relationship.
Similarly he asked witnesses question about "supervision,"
"control," "instructions" and "directions" by the Plewe
Construction Company and its agents. If the answers which
the witnesses gave to these questions are analyzed, it can
readily be seen that the instructions and directions and
supervision and control by Plewe Construction Company
were merely the specifications set forth orally by Mr. Plewe
at the inception of the shingling contract. These specifications were that the shingles should be laid onejfourth
inch apart and exposed to the weather 41j2 to 5 inches;
lines should be drawn so that each row of shingles would
be straight and even; and the wide shingles should be split
before being nailed on, because if they were not so split the
weather would split them.
The Referee's conclusion that the Plewe ConstructiQn
Company retained supervision and control over the shingl-
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ing job was based on an erroneous interpretation and application of the following provision found in Section 42-1-40
of the Workmen's Compensation Law:
"Where any employer procures any work to be
done wholly or in part for him by a contractor over
whose work he retains supervision or control, and
such work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, such contractor, and all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under
him, and all persons employed by any such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this
section, employees of such original employer."
In the same section, following the above quoted material
is the further provision :
"Any person, -firm or corporation engaged in
the performance of work as an independent contractor shall be deemed an employer within the
meaning of this section. The term 'independent contractor,' as herein used, is defined to be any person,
association or corporation engaged in the performance of any work for another, who, while so engaged,
is independent of the employer in all that pertains
to the execution of the work, is not subject to the
rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in
the performance of a definite job or piece of work,
and is subordinate to the employer only. in effecting
a result in accordance with the employer's design."
On several occasions this Court has held that the "supervision" and "control" mentioned in Section 42-1-40, means
supervision and control over the manner or method of the
performance of the work, in other words, "how" the contractor does the details of the work. In our present case,
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~=:

:!4(

the few specifications which were made at the commencement of Hunt and Marshall's shingling work were all aimed
at "effecting a result in accordance with" Plewe Construction Company's design of having a good shingle roof installed on the building in accordance with the plans and
specifications. Neither Herbert H. Plewe nor his brother
exercised any supervision or control over the manner or
method of Hunt and Marshall's shingling work. They did
inspect the work for the purpose of determining whether
the specifications were being complied with, that is whether
the shingles were being laid %Jhs of an inch apart and
4% to 5 inches to the weather, and whether the bottoms
of the shingles in each row were in a straight line, and
whether the wide shingles were being split before they
were nailed on.

Nobody representing the Plewe Construction Company
told Hunt or Marshall when they should commence work
in the morning or how long they should work each day
(R. 48). That shows one phase of their independence. AI~::;; though Hunt and Marshall agreed in advance that they
[ :2.:
;::: would get the shingling job finished as soon as possible,
~::.: there was no date specified for the completion of the shingl·; :• ing job.
··::~

:~

ttit~
.J1.~

n ili1:

Nobody instructed Hunt and Marshall how they were
to carry the bundles of shin.gles up the ladder or how many
they should carry on each trip. They were not told how
they should carry their tools or in what manner they should
hammer the nails, whether by long strokes or short taps~
So far as Hunt and Marshall were concerned, all that th~

~H
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Plewe Construction Company's representatives were interested in was to have a well shingled roof on the building
after Hunt and Marshall had completed their contract.
With respect to the tarpaulin on the roof, the Industrial
Commission concluded that Mr. Plewe's offer and actions
in putting up the tarpaulin for the purpose of keeping the
roof dry was an evidence of supervision over the shinglers'
work. The testimony is quite clear that 1\llr. Plewe offered
to protect the roof and the shinglers from the inclement
weather by means of the tarpaulin which belonged to the
Plewe Construction Company. This was for the benefit
of, and was an accommodation to, Hunt and Marshall and
Vernal Anderson. Several men were needed to lift the
tarpaulin to the desired position. After a conversation
between Mr. Plewe and Mr. Marshall, (the words of which
nobody seemed to remember) , Plewe and some of his carpenters and Marshall and Anderson all assisted in installing the tarpaulin (R. 64).

A concise statement of the law point involved in this
case is found in 58 American Jurisprudence, page 672, §

139:
"It is generally held that, for the purposes of
workmen's compensation, an employee of a contractor or subcontractor is not to be considered an em·
ployee of the principal employer or contractor, in
the absence of any provision to that effect."

Later in this brief we shall refer to some cases from
. states other than Utah and compare them to the case at
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11
bar. But first we feel that it is more important to mention
several cases in which the Supreme Court of Utah has
rendered decisions interpreting and applying the section
of our law relating to "supervision and control" and "independent contractors," which are controlling in our present case.
One of the most recent Utah cases involving the independent contractor relationship was Sommerville vs. Ind.
Comm., 113 Utah 504, 196 Pac. 2d 718, (decided Aug. 3,
1948). Sommerville was injured by an accident while he
and his partner, Gardner, were doing some carpentry
work on the gable end of a building owned by Ina Cook.
The Court held that the preponderance of the evidence indicated that Sommerville was an independent contractor.
In that case, as in the case at bar, the injured man was
working on a job where he was using his own tools, but
the materials were furnished or paid for by the one who
procured the independent contractor to do the work. Sommerville and Gardner submitted their bill to Mrs. Cook
and were paid for their work on the basis of $1.50 per
hour for the completed job. At page 509 of the Utah citation,
the Court's opinion says:
"The preponderance of the evidence points to
absence of right of control on the part of Mrs. Cook.
She was interested only in the end result-that the
repairs be accomplished. She was not interested in
the manner in which plaintiff and Gardner accomplished this end."
The cases of Christean vs. Ind. Comm., 113 Utah 451,
196 Pac. 2d 502, and Stover Bedding Co. vs. Ind. Comm.,
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99 Utah 423, 107 Pac. 2d 1027, 134 A. L. R. 1006, which
are cited in the Sommerville case, both dealt with the status
of salesmen. The majority opinion in each case held that
the salesman was an independent contractor, but the factual situation in those cases was not so similar to that in
our present case as was the Sommerville case and the
earlier one of Parkinson vs. Ind. Comm., 110 Utah 309,
172 Pac. 2d 136. At page 311 of the Utah citation the
Court's opinion contains the following:
"As stated by this court in Luker Sand & Gravel
Co. vs. Ind. Comm., 82 Utah 188, 23 Pac. 2d 225:
"Whether or not one engaged in a service for
another is an employee or an independent contractor,
within the meaning of the Industrial Act, is a jurisdictional question, presenting a situation which
requires this court to determine the status from the
facts submitted from a preponderance of the evidence * * *"
"Hence the determination of the question of
whether Molyneaux was an employee within the
meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act will
determine whether the Industrial Commission had
jurisdiction of the case."
Briefly, the facts in the Parkinson case were that Mr.
Molyneaux was injured while he was preparing to haul a
truck load of coke to the Woolsulate plant, which was operated by Parkinson. Molyneaux had made an agreement
with Parkinson to haul coke from two suppliers in Utah to
the Woolsulate plant at Midvale and he was to be paid a
fixed amount per ton for each load. The plant's operations
required a minimum of 35 ton per week, but Molyneaux
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was allowed to haul all the coke he wanted to, within the
capacity of the plant to store it. The Industrial Commission
decided that Molyneaux was an "employee," but the Su;.;
preme Court reversed the Commission and held that Molyneaux was an independent contractor. Among other elements of the contract, the Court mentioned that Molyneaux
was not required to haul for Woolsulate exclusively and
that he was free to choose the days on which he did the
hauling. At page 315 of the Court's opinion is found the
following language :
"We are of the opinion from all the facts and
circumstances of this case that the company did not
have the control of Molyneaux contemplated by the
statute to make the relationship that of employeremployee. The facts that the company could determine the place where the work was to be done
and had the right t.o discharge Molyneaux at any
time without contractual liability are not controlling.
Anyone employing an independent contractor, such
as a plumber or a building contractor, has the right
to determine where he wants the work to be done.
It is when the employer can not only determine
where the work shall be done but how it should be
executed that the relationship is that of employeremployee."

::-~:

=:·'

c;;:

Ewer vs. Ind. Comm., 112 Utah 538, 189 Pac. 2d 959,
is another recent case in which this Court held that a man
was an independent contractor and not an employee, even
though the materials, (sewer pipe), were furnished by the
one with whom he contracted, and the independent contractor was to be paid for his services on a footage basis.
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Included in the Industrial Commission's order denying the application for rehearing, (R. 78, 79 and 80), several citations were mentioned for the purpose of supporting
the Commission's conclusions. We shall refer to that part
of the order as the Commission's brief. Most of those
citations are not applicable to our present case, because
of the differences in the factual situations or in the statutory provisions involved. For example, the Commission's
brief refers to 105 A. L. R. 580. That volume and page
commences a discussion of several Louisiana cases. They
mention that the Louisiana workmen's compensation law
provides that any person, referred to in the section as
principal, who should undertake to execute any work which
is a part of his trade, business, occupation, or which he
has contracted to perform, and who contracts with any
person for the execution of the whole or any part of such
work, should be liable for compensation to any employee
engaged therein to the same extent that he would have
been, had the employee been employed directly by him.
The Louisiana provision does not require the existence of
"supervision and control," as does the Utah statutory provision.
The Commission's brief (R. 79) also refers to the
Connecticut case of Bello vs. Notkins, 124 Atl. 831, 101
Conn. 34, which deals with a statutory provision differing
from Utah's. That case involved Section 5345 of the Connecticut workmen's compensation law:
"When any principal employer procures any
work to be done, wholly or in part for him, by a
contractor, or through him by a subcontractor, and
the work so procured to be done is a part or process
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in the trade or business of such principal employer,
and is performed in, on or about premises under
his control, then such principal employer shall be
liable to pay all compensation under this chapter
to the same extent as if the work were done without
the intervention of such contractor or subcontractor."
At this point we would like to inform the Court that
if the Utah workmen's compensation act had included a
provision such as is found in the Louisiana and Connecticut
law's above mentioned, we would have paid Vernal Anderson's claim and not brought the case to the Supreme Court
for review.
The Arizona case of Grabe vs. Ind. Comm., 38 Ariz.
322, 299 Pac. 1031, mentioned by the Commission, (R. 80),
did involve a statutory provision practically the same as
ours, but the factual situation was quite dissimilar to the
case at bar. The original employer, A. C. Grabe, owned
or leased a brickyard. He had covered all of the brickyard
employees under a workmen's compensation policy, on
which he paid premiums for more than three years prior
to an accident suffered by a man named Castro. Grabe's
policy expired just prior to Castro's accident. Grabe reported Castro's accident to the Arizona Industrial Commission on the usual form. At the Industrial Commission
hearing, Grabe testified that he had contracted the making
of bricks ~o Jose Romo and paid Romo at the rate of $2.25
per thousand for bricks made. Romo hired the men he
needed and paid them out of this money. The injured man,
Castro, was one of the men Romo had hired. Grabe's own
t~stimony at the hearing showed that he retained the right

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
of control over the "manner and method" of Ramo's operations. Consequently Grabe was held liab~e for compensation
benefits to Castro.
We have found two cases from states other than Utah,
in which the injured party was a shingler.

Nollett vs. Holland Lumber Co., 4 N. W. 2d 554, was
a Nebraska case decided in 1942. Number 6 of the syllabus
briefly summarizes the case :
"Where decedent and another were employed as
a team by a company engaged in the business of
selling roofs, to apply roofing at a spe·cified price
per square and furnished their own tools and equipment without direction by company as to the manner of erecting scaffolding or attaching ladders so
as to insure safety of the workmen, decedent was an
"independent contractor" and not entitled to benefits under the workmen's compensation law."

Thompson vs. Braselton Federal Insulating & Building Materials Co., 223 Pac. 2d 527, was an Oklahoma case
decided in 1950. Number 4 of the syllabus briefly summarizes the case :
"Where compensation claimant had been engaged in roofing work and took jobs where he found
them, and hired his son and another to help repair
dwelling on which claimant was injured, and claimant was paid at specified rate per square, claimant
was an independent contractor, and fact that claimant had been requested to work on Labor Day, the
day of his injury, so that alleged employer could
weatherstrip next day, did not change his status so
as to entitle him to compensation."
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the award of the Industrial
Commission against Plewe Construction and The State Insurance Fund should be annulled.
Respectfully submitted,
F. A. TROTTIER,
Attorney for Plaintiffs.
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